An Introduction

The popularity of remarriage after divorce has flooded the evangelical world and reached acceptance in the minds of many. But what does the New Testament have to say in this respect? In some countries the matter has become taboo and whosoever exhumes the subject is regarded as a potential threat to the establishment.

A brief history

There was a time when most evangelicals believed remarriage after divorce was condemned by the Scriptures. Then this popular belief underwent a transition and we were told that under some exceptions the Scriptures permit remarriage after divorce. Afterward came the third and present phase: Remarried divorcees are welcome in our churches without investigating the nature of their divorce. The mere existence of a marriage certificate has become a sufficient reason—in most milieus—to receive them as members of the community. So a person can divorce his wife for any reason, remarry, and become an active member of an evangelical community.

However, when the subject is discussed, we continue to be told that remarriage after divorce is possible only within the limits of certain exceptions. It follows there are some discrepancies between what is being practiced and what is being taught. This should not surprise anyone, for it would be impossible to maintain scripturally what is being practiced in countless evangelical churches in regard to divorce and remarriage.

My objective

In the following considerations I will question the validity of all remarriages after divorce, i.e., I will challenge the claim that under certain circumstances the Scripture permits remarriage after divorce.

It is not my intention to denigrate the divorcees who have remarried. My aim is simply to investigate the Scriptures, mainly the New Testament, to see what is being taught in this respect.

The myth of complexity

Actually the matter is not as complicated as it may appear. In the New Testament only Jesus and Paul talk about it, and from what they say a clear conclusion can be drawn.

If the New Testament would be too unclear to draw an authoritative conclusion we would have to find the answer in Judaism. But happily, this is not the case.

To attempt to use the Old Testament to blur the clear picture presented in the New is an attempt expressing a certain degree of despair. Imagine if someone would use this method to draw a conclusion regarding polygamy. What would you tell him? You would tell him the answer is plainly stated in the New Testament and that the conclusion should be drawn from there. The same is to be applied to divorce and remarriage. Consequently, as I proceed, I will refer to the Old Testament and to Roman Laws solely in view to understand the context of Jesus’ declaration in the Gospel of Matthew, a Gospel written to Jews.

About the presentation

These considerations will be divided in several sections to make it easier for you to follow my line of thought. I will attempt to keep each consideration as short as possible, which will be a challenge from beginning to end. If I pay little attention to some passages it is not by fear of where they may lead, but rather to focus on what is necessary to understand the essence of what is being taught. To attempt to be exhaustive at this point would only clog the exposition and make it difficult to understand, at least for the non-initiated.

Some of you might find “Section Three” somewhat difficult to comprehend. But with a bit of effort I am confident you will catch the point. Read it slowly, and take time to think about what is written.

Section One

What Jesus Teaches

First Consideration

To analyze the Messianic teaching regarding divorce and remarriage we have the testimony of three Gospels.

Mark’s Gospel

If we would have only the Gospel of Mark to draw our conclusion we would have to deduce that all remarriages after divorce are sinful. Mark reports the words of Jesus as follows:

So He said to them, “Whoever divorces his wife and marries another commits adultery against her. And if a woman divorces her husband and marries another, she commits adultery” (Mark 10:11, 12).

Here the statement is airtight, leaving no room for misunderstanding. The context is clear and the conclusion easy to draw. From this affirmation it would be impossible to infer that some remarriages after divorce are permitted when the husband or wife is still alive.

It is meaningful to notice that those who received this Gospel had only these two verses to draw their conclusion from. According to most scholars the Gospel of Matthew was written years later, and even if Matthew’s Gospel had come first, it would be unreasonable to pretend that all the recipients of Mark’s Gospel had access to Matthew’s Gospel. To embark on such presumption would be to speculate beyond reason. After all, the Gospel of Mark was written to gentiles and Matthew’s Gospel to Jews. However, nearly all scholars believe the Gospel of Mark was written several years before Matthew’s Gospel (some suggest more than a decade earlier).

Luke’s Gospel

“Whoever divorces his wife and marries another commits adultery; and whoever marries her who is divorced from her husband commits adultery” (Luke 16:18). Again, if we would have only the Gospel of Luke to draw our conclusion from, we would deduce the same thing, i.e., all remarriages after divorce are sinful (when the husband or wife is still alive).

Matthew’s Gospel

In contrast to Mark and Luke, Matthew reports an exception clause:

But I say to you that whoever divorces his wife for any reason except πορνεία causes her to commit adultery; and whoever marries a woman who is divorced commits adultery” (Matt. 5:32). And again: “And I say to you, whoever divorces his wife, except for πορνεία and marries another, commits adultery; and whoever marries her who is divorced commits adultery” (Matt. 19:9).

I left the exception clause in Greek for as we will see, there is no consensus of how the word should be translated. Those maintaining the Scripture permits some remarriages after divorce believe the word πορνεία means “sexual immorality” in general, and those maintaining remarriage after divorce is always morally wrong believe the word means “fornication” only, i.e., the sexual sin of someone unmarried.

A very important question

More will be written about πορνεία later on, but for the moment what interests us is that Matthew reports this exception clause while Mark and Luke ignore it altogether. Not only does Matthew report it, he reports it twice, i.e., in both passages related to divorce. Why does he insist so much on this exception clause while Mark and Luke report the words of Jesus as forbidding all remarriages after divorce, and this, without mentioning any exception? This question must be answered and answered satisfactorily. A vague and doubtful explanation will not be sufficient at this point. After all, this question is at the core of the matter in hand.

Second Consideration

The answer my opponents propose

The best popular answer given by those who maintain πορνεία means “sexual immorality” in general is the following:

The most likely reason for the difference is that Matthew was spelling out what Luke and Mark leave implicit within the social context” (James Patrick Holding).

The idea this answer conveys is that everybody living in that historical and social context already knew the exception clause. Consequently, according to my opponents, Mark and Luke didn’t see the need to mention it.

First rebuttal

The problem with this answer is that it harbors serious inconsistencies. The first one is that since my opponents believe πορνεία means “sexual immorality” in general, the exception clause would have been only known—or surely mostly known—within the Jewish social context, because an influential Jewish teacher named Shammai had taught zealously for decades that sexual immorality was the only reason permitting divorce. His doctrine had been diffused far and wide in Israel and had become part of the social context of the Jews. But strangely enough, it is precisely Matthew—whose Gospel is addressed to Jews—who saw the need to spell out the exception clause. Why? It strongly suggests Matthew didn’t agree with the theory my opponents propose, for if the theory had carried any sort of credibility in Matthew’s mind he, of all people, would have omitted the exception clause.

The second inconsistency is the inverse of the first, for contrary to the Jewish social context the exception clause was not implicit in the social context of the gentiles to whom Mark and Luke addressed their Gospel, or surely, infinitely less implicit than in Jewish society. But strangely, it is precisely Mark and Luke who omitted the exception clause. Why? If Matthew would have omitted it, and Mark and Luke reported it, then the proposed answer could have a shred of credibility, but the biblical facts reveal the very opposite.

It seems to me the answer my contenders proposed shipwrecks on the very cornerstone of their theory, for we see the exception clause mentioned where it was highly implicit in the social context, and omitted where it was nearly unconceivable in the social context.

Second rebuttal

Another factor weakening the answer of my opponents is that many who were listening to Jesus had already observed He had come to change the moral context of His days. What had been implicit in the social context was often demolished and replaced by a higher moral standard. A simple reading of Matthew 5:20–48 makes it plain enough. This passage manifests a substantial moral reform, i.e., a passing from what existed in the social context to what had never existed in it. This undeniable historical fact makes void the answer my opponents suggest.

To propose Mark and Luke were leaning on a social context Jesus had just replaced amounts to a proposal bereft of rational content.

Third rebuttal

Another factor mowing down the answer of my opponents is the very statement reported by Mark and Luke. Mark writes: “Whoever divorces his wife and marries another commits adultery against her. And if a woman divorces her husband and marries another, she commits adultery” (Mark 10:11, 12). And Luke reports: “Whoever divorces his wife and marries another commits adultery; and whoever marries her who is divorced from her husband commits adultery” (Luke 16:18).

These two statements are so absolutely categorical that to have implied an exception clause would have amounted to a moral suicide, for surely the declaration of Jesus—as reported by Mark and Luke—left no room for such speculation. They didn’t imply any exception, neither did they dispatch the possibility of an exception imported from the social context. As we have already seen, the social context of the gentiles could have hardly evoked such an exception, much less given it credential.

Fourth rebuttal

If the answer proposed by my opponents would be valid, the statements of a present-day evangelist could be constantly reinterpreted through the social context. If he would write to people of a catholic country: “All men are sinners”, they would have the right to interpret his declaration through their social context and read: “All men are sinners except the Pope”. Again when he would write: “We are saved by faith”, they would have the right to infuse their social context to the statement and read: “We are saved by faith and by works”. It follows that if this contextual implication would be a valid practice, the evangelist could never be sure he is understood, and the people could never be sure they understood what the evangelist was trying to say. At last, on judgment day, these people could tell God: “The social context confused Your Gospel. We thought the evangelist had left some parts out because they were implicit within the social context.” Of course God could answer: “To add to my words on the base of your social context and pretend you were right was foolish.” And God’s answer would be absolutely rational.

It seems to me the answer proposed by my opponents undermines the efficiency of communication, and appears thus highly defective.

Hence the question continues to stand unanswered: Why did Matthew insist so much on an exception clause while Mark and Luke ignore it absolutely? Without an adequate answer the view of my opponents loses a great deal of credibility.

I insist, if there would be an exception permitting married couples to divorce and remarry, then Mark and Luke would have been misleading and confusing writers, for not only they didn’t mention such an exception but also obliterated—by their absoluteness—the possibility of having one. Every word they report points to the unlawfulness of all remarriages after divorce, i.e., if the former husband or wife is still alive.

A direct implication

If we start with the view held by my opponents, the following scenario would have been possible around the year 65 AD, or even today in certain milieus:

The scenario: A man marries a woman who had divorced her husband three years earlier. He has five children with her and the family lives happily until he reads the Gospel of Luke. All of a sudden the conclusion is forced on him: He and the woman he married are living in adultery. After all, this is precisely what he reads in the Gospel of Luke:

Whoever divorces his wife and marries another commits adultery; and whoever marries her who is divorced from her husband commits adultery” (Luke 16:18).

Moved by the fear of God the man repents and leaves the woman with whom he has had five children. A few years later he marries again, but this time with a woman who has never been married. Three children result from this new union. Again they live happily for some years until he falls on a Gospel of Matthew. Reading it carefully he discovers the Scripture didn’t condemn his first marriage since his wife had divorced her first husband for cause of sexual immorality. “Well,” he says, “this means I am now living in adultery.” Again he falls on his knees, repents, and returns to the one who is—according to my opponents—his real wife. What a mess! And all this because—according to my opponents—Luke would have only stated the general rule, omitting the exception clause. It seems to me the answer my opponents offer denigrates Mark and Luke and turns them into irresponsible teachers. More so when I am told the exception clause is the kingpin upon which the whole doctrine of divorce and remarriage pivots.

If the view of my opponents would be right, a responsible teacher should always mention— and I insist, always—the exception clause side by side with the rule. To do otherwise would amount to present only a part of the truth, and as we all understand, partial truths are often as misleading as partial lies.

Conclusion

The fact is that my contenders have given no satisfactory answers to the question mentioned above. Their attempts have remained not only exceedingly weak but also implausible. The fact Mark and Luke condemn all remarriages after divorce creates a problem that seems insurmountable for my opponents. As a matter of fact, I never met anyone who could surmount it.

Section Two

Answering the question

Third Consideration

Why does Matthew insist so much on the exception clause while Mark and Luke report the words of Jesus as forbidding all remarriages after divorce, i.e., without mentioning any exception?

A very plausible answer

As I have already mentioned, it is important to notice that while Mark and Luke address their Gospel to the gentiles, Matthew addresses his to the Jews. I suggest the answer we are looking for lays in this singularity, for as we will see, there existed a custom peculiar to the Jews which provoked the need for an exception clause—a need nonexistent among gentiles. In this light Matthew, Mark and Luke stand as accurate teachers, all of them responsible and complete in their respective report. None of them lead their readers to confusing situations, and all of them stand in agreement with each other.

A Jewish custom

Contrary to the gentiles, the Jewish betrothal was nearly as binding as marriage itself. In fact, after a betrothal, the man was already called “husband” and the woman “wife”. This is seen in such scriptures as Deuteronomy 22:23,24:

If a young woman who is a virgin is betrothed to a husband, and a man finds her in the city and lies with her, then you shall bring them both out to the gate of that city, and you shall stone them to death with stones, the young woman because she did not cry out in the city, and the man because he humbled his neighbor’s wife; so you shall put away the evil from among you.”

The same is seen in the New Testament:

Now the birth of Jesus Christ was as follows: After His mother Mary was betrothed to Joseph, before they came together, she was found with child of the Holy Spirit. Then Joseph her husband, being a just man, and not wanting to make her a public example, was minded to put her away secretly. But while he thought about these things, behold, an angel of the Lord appeared to him in a dream, saying, “Joseph, son of David, do not be afraid to take to you Mary your wife, for that which is conceived in her is of the Holy Spirit” (Matthew 1:18–20).

Writing about the Jewish betrothal Rabbi Maurice Lamm explains: “This taking is a positive commandment and is performed in one of three ways—with money, by contract, or by cohabitation… and it is everywhere called kiddushin or erusin. And a woman who is “acquired” in one of these three ways is called mc’kudeshet or arusah [a betrothed woman]. And as soon as she is “acquired” and becomes betrothed, even though she has not cohabited and did not even enter the groom’s home, she is a married woman. Anyone, other than her husband, who cohabits with her, is guilty of capital punishment. If he wishes to separate from her, he requires a divorce.”  (https://www.chabad.org/library/article_cdo/aid/465162/jewish/The-Jewish-Marriage-Ceremony.htm)

We have also the Jewish Encyclopedia which reads: “The root אָרַשׂ (“to betroth”), from which the Talmudic abstract כְּלוּלֹת (“betrothal”) is derived, must be taken in this sense; i.e., to contract an actual though incomplete marriage. In two of the passages in which it occurs the betrothed woman is directly designated as “wife” (II Sam. iii. 14, “my wife whom I have betrothed” (“erasti”), and Deut. xxii. 24, where the betrothed is designated as “the wife of his neighbor.” In strict accordance with this sense the rabbinical law declares that the betrothal is equivalent to an actual marriage and only to be dissolved by a formal divorce.” (http://www.jewishencyclopedia.com/articles/3229-betrothal)

Rabbi Marcus Jastrow and rabbi Bernard Drachman rightly point out that the Jewish betrothal could only be broken by a formal divorce. As they explain: “The term “betrothal” in Jewish law must not be understood in its modern sense; that is, the agreement of a man and a woman to marry, by which the parties are not, however, definitely bound, but which may be broken or dissolved without formal divorce. Betrothal or engagement such as this is not known either to the Bible or to the Talmud, and only crept in among the medieval and modern Jews through the influence of the example of the Occidental nations among whom they dwelt, without securing a definite status in rabbinical law.” (http://www.jewishencyclopedia.com/articles/3229-betrothal)

“Eerdman’s Handbook to the Bible states, ‘Betrothal, unlike modern engagement, was legally binding and could be broken only by divorce.’”

In contrast to the gentiles, the Jewish betrothal was binding and could not be broken easily. Under the Mosaic Law the husband had to accuse and demonstrate—after the first sexual intercourse—that his betrothed wife was not a virgin. If the evidences backed up his accusation the woman was stoned to death and the betrothal bond was thus broken (see Deuteronomy 22:13–21). However, only the priests were under the obligation to marry a virgin (Leviticus 21:7). Consequently not all the betrothed wives who were not virgin were stoned to death, but only those accused publicly by their husband.

In the days of Jesus

However, in the days of Jesus, the Roman authorities had taken away from the Jewish courts the right to impose the death penalty. According to the Talmud (Sanhedrin 41a) this was done around the year 30 BC. This juridical shift is confirmed in John 18:31,

Then Pilate said to them, ‘You take Him and judge Him according to your law.’ Therefore the Jews said to him, ‘It is not lawful for us to put anyone to death’ ”.

According to their law they believed Jesus ought to die, “We have a law, and according to our law He ought to die, because He made Himself the Son of God” (John 19:7). But according to their own words they could not do it legally.

Some might object by pointing to the death of Stephen in Acts 7:58. But the death of Stephen does not demonstrate the killing was legal under Roman laws. The case of the apostle Paul—reported in Acts 23:11–23 and 25:3—makes clear that if these Jews would have killed the apostle they would have been guilty of murder under Roman laws. There is no doubt about it.

A confirmation

What we have seen so far is confirmed by the fact that in Matthew 5:32 & 19:9 only the husband is offered the possibility to divorce his wife, not vice versa:

“But I say to you that whoever divorces his wife for any reason except πορνεία causes her to commit adultery; and whoever marries a woman who is divorced commits adultery.” (Matt. 5:32)

“And I say to you, whoever divorces his wife, except for fornication, and marries another, commits adultery; and whoever marries her who is divorced commits adultery.” (Matt. 19:9)

As we can see, nowhere in Matthew’s gospel do we read that the wife could divorce her husband. Why? Because there was no way for her to demonstrate her husband was not a virgin at their first sexual intercourse. But, as the following verses affirm, the man could:

If any man takes a wife, and goes in to her, and detests her, ¹⁴ and charges her with shameful conduct, and brings a bad name on her, and says, ‘I took this woman, and when I came to her I found she was not a virgin,’ ¹⁵ then the father and mother of the young woman shall take and bring out the evidence of the young woman’s virginity to the elders of the city at the gate. ¹⁶ And the young woman’s father shall say to the elders, ‘I gave my daughter to this man as wife, and he detests her. ¹⁷ Now he has charged her with shameful conduct, saying, “I found your daughter was not a virgin,” and yet these are the evidences of my daughter’s virginity.’ And they shall spread the cloth before the elders of the city. ¹⁸ Then the elders of that city shall take that man and punish him; ¹⁹ and they shall fine him one hundred shekels of silver and give them to the father of the young woman, because he has brought a bad name on a virgin of Israel. And she shall be his wife; he cannot divorce her all his days.

²⁰ “But if the thing is true, and evidences of virginity are not found for the young woman, ²¹ then they shall bring out the young woman to the door of her father’s house, and the men of her city shall stone her to death with stones, because she has done a disgraceful thing in Israel, to play the harlot in her father’s house. So you shall put away the evil from among you.” (Deut. 22:13–21)

Obviously, according to this law, only the husband was permitted to divorce his wife if the evidence of her virginity was lacking. But since such evidence didn’t exist on the side of the husband, there was no possibility for the wife to divorce him, that is why Matthew 5:32 & 19:9 refers only to the husband divorcing his wife, not vice versa.

Another thing to notice is that if the betrothed wife had the evidence of her virginity her husband could no longer divorce her: “And she shall be his wife; he cannot divorce her all his days.” (Deut. 22:19)

The exception clause

In this light it is easy to understand why Matthew mentioned an exception clause, for contrary to Mark and Luke he was addressing his Gospel to Jews. Since the Roman authorities had forbidden the Jewish community to implement the death penalty for a non-virgin betrothed wife, the Jews had opted to deal with the issue by means of a legal divorce, which could be obtained by showing the absence of evidences of her virginity as explained in Deuteronomy 22:20.

It is this custom which created room for the exception clause. Obviously Jesus had endorsed the custom since it promoted moral purity. On this account Matthew 5:32 should read: “But I say to you that whoever divorces his wife for any reason except fornication causes her to commit adultery; and whoever marries a woman who is divorced commits adultery”. It must be so since πορνεία refers here to a sexual sin done prior to marriage. In English—as well as in French, Spanish, Portuguese and Italian—such sin is called “fornication”. The same is to be applied to Matthew 19:9.

As for those who had consumed their marriage without accusing their wife of fornication, the words of Jesus stand clear and authoritative:

So then, they are no longer two but one flesh. Therefore what God has joined together, let not man separate” (Matt. 19:6).

As we will see, to insist πορνεία in Matthew 5:32 and 19:9 means sexual immorality in general one is obliged to create several inconsistencies as well as useless points of tension.

I repeat, if πορνεία in Matthew 5:32 and 19:9 would mean sexual immorality in general, then the report of Mark and Luke would be highly misleading. To say that their respective statement implies an exception deduced from the social context is a subtle attempt to avoid the obvious conclusion.

When I preach in some evangelical churches and say: “Remarriages after divorce are sinful”, my opponents don’t say: “His statement implies an exception clause deduced from the ecclesiastical context”. They contend that what I say is false, and this, even if the exception clause has truly become an intrinsic part of their ecclesiastical context. When I am told: “You cannot come and preach in our church anymore”, if I would answer: “I didn’t mention the exception clause because I thought it was going to be deduced from the ecclesiastical context”, I guarantee you, it would not help me very much.

Fourth Consideration

An attempt of rebuttal

My opponents have attempted to refute the betrothal explanation in two ways. Some have suggested that it is no valid since the penalty for such immoral behavior was death, not divorce. But as we have already seen, in Jesus’ days, the Romans had forbidden the Jewish courts to implement the death penalty.

Their second attempt states that linguistically speaking πορνεία can never mean fornication only. But does this second objection stand the test of Scripture?

We read in 1^st Corinthians 7:1,2

Now concerning the things whereof ye wrote unto me: It is good for a man not to touch a woman. Nevertheless, to avoid πορνεία (porneia), let every man have his own wife, and let every woman have her own husband.”

Obviously, in this verse, it is indisputable that πορνεία refers solely to the sexual sin of someone unmarried, i.e., to fornication. The immediate context reveals it cannot refer to adultery. It would be a contradiction in terms to tell someone: “To avoid adultery get married”, because adultery is the sexual sin of someone married. To get married can only help a person to avoid fornication (the sexual sin of someone unmarried). This is self-evident. Consequently we see that in some cases πορνεία can only mean fornication, not adultery, nor sodomy, nor incest. The same logic is to be applied to Matthew 5:32 and 19:9 (although for different reasons).

The same is seen in John 8:41 “Then they said to Him, “We were not born of πορνεία; we have one Father—God.”” Here the Pharisees were pointing their finger to Jesus, implying He was engendered before Mary was married to Joseph, i.e., out of fornication, and they use the word πορνεία (porneia) to convey their accusation. Here also the context shows that πορνεία (porneia), in this verse, can only mean fornication. Imagine if a well intended Christian would insist that in this verse πορνεία includes all sexual sins. What would you tell him?

In these two examples we see how the meaning of ‘πορνεία’ can be reduced to a specific meaning, and this meaning can only be defined by the context.

This semantic use is also confirmed by 1 Corinthians 6:9 which says:

Do not be deceived. Neither fornicators (pornoi), nor idolater, nor adulterers (moikoi), nor homosexuals, nor sodomites nor thieves, nor covetous, nor drunkards, nor revilers, nor extortioners will inherit the kingdom of God.”

In this verse “pornoi” (from πορνεία) is differentiated from other sexual sins. Consequently it cannot include the other sexual sins from which it is singled out. If I would write something like: “I didn’t commit any sexual immorality, neither adultery, nor sodomy, nor transvestism, nor incest”, my phrase would be badly constructed. After all, sexual immorality would include the other sexual sins I subsequently mention. Therefore the right construction would be, “I didn’t commit sexual immoralities such as adultery, sodomy, transvestism, and incest.” But the Greek text in 1 Corinthians 6:9 presents the former construction, which means “pornoi” cannot include the sins subsequently mentioned. Here again we are facing one of the basic rules of linguistics.

For instance, the New International Version translates the verse this way: “Neither the sexually immoral nor idolaters nor adulterers nor men who have sex with men …” But this phrase is badly constructed; it makes one believe that adulterers and men who have sex with men are not included in those who are sexually immoral. In brief, to say that the meaning of πορνεία can never be reduced to fornication only is a statement unsupported by the Scripture.

In the following section I will focus on the meaning of πορνεία as reported in Matthew 5:32 and 19:9. We will see that it cannot possibly mean adultery, neither any other sexual immoralities produced by someone married.

Section three

What πορνεία means in Matthew 5:32 and 19:9

The considerations forming this section will deal with the word πορνεία (porneia) as reported in Matthew 5:32 and 19:9. It is my firm conviction that in these two verses the word refers solely to fornication (the sexual sin of someone unmarried) and cannot possibly include such sin as adultery (the sexual sin of someone married). But for the sake of argument I will begin with the presupposition held by my opponents, which is: πορνεία means sexual immorality in general. This I will do to see where this presupposition leads.

Fifth Consideration

To understand Section Three the reader will have to comprehend first of all the semantic principle of all-inclusiveness. The principle can be stated as follows: If a word is used without a restrictive clause the word is all-inclusive.

To understand the principle let us look to an example. If I write: “The windows of my house are blue”, it should not be interpreted to mean: Most windows of my house are blue, or some windows of my house are blue. If I have expressed myself clearly, my statement can only mean one thing, namely, all the windows of my house are blue. It must be so because in this statement the word ‘windows’ is all-inclusive, at least as far as the house is concerned. If one or more windows had been of another color, I would have had to add a restrictive clause to express myself clearly, or make use of a quantitative word such as ‘most’ or ‘some’.

Now if we would have a statement written in Greek which would read: “The windows of my house are πράσινος”, and there would be some disagreement in regard to the meaning of the Greek word πράσινος—a party maintaining that πράσινος means purple, and another party maintaining that πράσινος means green—how could the problem be solved? Obviously, if someone would demonstrate that one of the windows is green, then we could conclude with certainty that πράσινος cannot possibly mean purple, and that all the windows of the house are green, because “windows” is here all-inclusive, at least as far as the house is concerned. In other words, all the windows of the house will have to have the same color.

The same principle is to be applied to the Scriptures. For instance, in Romans 6:23 we read:

For the wages of sin is death.”

Since there is no restrictive clause following the word ‘sin’, the word must be understood to be all-inclusive. Therefore it would be inadmissible for anyone to say: “This scripture doesn’t imply stealing”. No one has the authority to put exceptions where God puts none, or to restrict the meaning of a word God leaves unrestricted. Therefore if a word is used without a restrictive clause the word is all-inclusive. This is one of the most basic rules of semantics, a rule that can be useful to draw incontrovertible conclusions.

Sixth Consideration

The first thing to realize when we read Matthew 5:32 and 19:9 is that Jesus offers no regulations or specifications for the word πορνεία (porneia). He simply uses the word unconditionally, i.e., He attaches no restrictions or qualifications to it. Therefore it follows that in these two verses πορνεία is all–inclusive, i.e., it includes all πορνεία and excludes none. To say God permits divorce for some types of πορνεία but not for others would amount to attribute to ourselves an authority we don’t have. If the exception clause is going to stand, it must stand for all πορνεία or else something is wrong with our interpretation of the word πορνεία.

Understanding the principle

Let me make use of an example. If someone would advance that πορνεία refers to all sins—sexual and nonsexual—and somebody would demonstrate by means of the Scriptures that lying doesn’t offer a biblical ground for divorce and remarriage, then he would have demonstrated that πορνεία cannot possibly refer to all sins. Consequently, the following step would be to narrow the meaning of πορνεία so it might stand the test of all-inclusiveness.

Now if we begin with the presupposition that in the verses under consideration πορνεία means sexual immorality in general, then it follows—and this by logical necessity—that all sexual sins can lead to a lawful divorce. No exceptions can be permitted at this point within the wide range of sexual immoralities. Hence, πορνεία will have to include all sexual sins (this is, if πορνεία would truly mean sexual immorality).

Since it is so, if it can be demonstrated that a single sexual sin cannot be included in the word πορνεία, it would indicate πορνεία cannot mean sexual immorality in general. This conclusion would oblige us to find a narrower meaning. Once that meaning is proposed it will have to be all-inclusive, otherwise we would be back to square one.

Seventh Consideration

If the word πορνεία would mean sexual immorality in general, it would have to include all cases of adultery. Consequently, if it can be demonstrated that in some cases adultery doesn’t provide a legal ground for divorce, then we could conclude all adulteries don’t provide a legal ground for divorce. It must be so since πορνεία is all–inclusive. As we have already seen, to say, “πορνεία includes adultery”, and then turn around and say, “but it doesn’t include this kind and that other kind of adultery”, would be to contradict oneself. After all, no one has the right to put exceptions within the exception clause reported in Matthew 5:32 and 19:9. This is no mere sophism; it is simply the demands of reason. To depart from such basic logic would lead to irrational interpretations. With this in mind, let us look to the two verses under consideration.

Eighth Consideration

We read in Matthew 5:32, “But I say to you that whoever divorces his wife for any reason except πορνεία causes her to commit adultery; and whoever marries a woman who is divorced commits adultery.”

This verse is divided into two independent entities. We have the generic rule and the exception to the rule. This gives birth to two possible statements: one according to the generic rule, and another according to the exception clause.

A—The statement according to the generic rule (Sexual Immorality View)

According to the Sexual Immorality View this generic rule could be stated as follows: “But I say to you that whoever divorces his wife for what has nothing to do with sexual immorality causes her to commit adultery, …”

It is important to notice here that whoever marries a woman who is so divorced commits adultery, i.e., according to the generic rule the innocent wife cannot remarry. This reality—which has been expressed by Jesus—should make my opponents think, for here the faithful wife who has been possibly forsaken by an unjust, despotic, ruthless and selfish husband cannot remarry. But, according to the interpretation my opponents give to Matthew 5:32 & 19:9, the one who has been forsaken by an adulterous man can. This seems hardly fair, because one of the faithful wives can remarry and the other cannot. How can my opponents explain such a flagrant discrepancy?

B—The statement according to the exception clause (Sexual Immorality View)

Then we have the exception clause. How could the statement be transferred to this clause? Following what the adherents of the Sexual Immorality View believe we could read the statement as follows: “But I say to you that whoever divorces his wife for sexual immorality does not cause her to commit adultery; …”

As we have seen previously, this statement can be valid only if it can be applied to all sexual sins, which would include the sin of a wife or husband who has committed adultery a single time. In fact, for the statement to be valid, it should be applicable to a wife or husband who has committed adultery, repented with sincerity of heart, and received God’s forgiveness shortly after the sin was committed. But as we are about to see, such application would create insurmountable tension within the Scripture, as well as inconsistencies and discrepancies of all kinds.

In what follows I will demonstrate that in some cases adultery doesn’t provide a ground for remarriage after divorce. This will create a problem for my opponents because πορνεία in Matthew 5:32 and 19:9 is all-inclusive and therefore should include all cases of adultery, this is, if adultery is to be included in the word πορνεία.

Ninth Consideration

In 1 Corinthians 6:9 we read that no adulterers will inherit the kingdom of God. But what about the adulterer that has repented with sincerity of heart, and received forgiveness from God? Can such a person inherit the kingdom of God? As we all understand, the answer is affirmative because God doesn’t consider that person an adulterer anymore. That person is adjudged innocent before God, and he is so adjudged because he is now truly innocent.

We have seen in Matthew 5:32 that the generic rule doesn’t permit a husband to divorce his innocent wife, for in so doing he would cause her to commit adultery. But what about the forgiven wife who is now declared innocent by God Himself and no longer regarded as adulteress? For that a forgiven wife has been made innocent by the blood of the everlasting covenant is a truth that cannot be denied.

It seems to me the adherents of the Sexual Immorality View are facing a dilemma. Either they must argue that while one husband would cause his innocent wife to commit adultery if he divorces her (Matt. 5:32), another husband would not cause his innocent wife to commit adultery if he divorces her; or else, they must regulate and restrict the word πορνεία—a word Jesus has left without regulations or any sort of restrictions. In other words, they would have to create an exception within the exception clause, which would be inadmissible. To do so would be as putting an exception to Romans 6:23, which says: “For the wages of sin is death”. As we all understand no one has the right to do it. The same is to be applied to πορνεία in Matthew 5:32 and 19:9.

It follows the husband of the forgiven wife cannot divorce her although she has committed adultery. If he would, he would be guilty of causing his innocent wife to commit adultery in the future. Surely God could not permit such a thing. Consequently, in Matthew 5:32 and 19:9, πορνεία cannot mean sexual immorality in general since it cannot include adultery in general.

Conclusion

Since it has been demonstrated that in some cases adultery doesn’t provide a legal ground for divorce, we can conclude that all adulteries don’t provide a legal ground for divorce, and this, because in Matthew 5:32 and 19:9 πορνεία is all–inclusive. Consequently πορνεία cannot possibly mean sexual immorality in general since it cannot mean adultery in general. It follows the meaning of the word will have to be narrowed and stand the test of all–inclusiveness.

The five considerations forming Section Three have already demonstrated that πορνεία cannot mean sexual immorality in general, nor can it include adultery. Added to it, we have seen that if πορνεία would mean sexual immorality in general, Mark and Luke would have been flirting with heresy, for they reported the words of Jesus as saying all remarriages after divorce are sinful (that is, if the husband or wife is still alive). These evidences are sufficient to conclude that πορνεία cannot mean sexual immorality in general, nor can it include adultery. But for the sake of argument let us look to a few more inconsistencies.

Section four

Another point of tension

As you read the following considerations, keep in mind that I am assessing the interpretation my opponents give to the word πορνεία in Matthew 5:32 and 19:9, which is, πορνεία means sexual immorality in general. Consequently, the questions and answers are based on this presupposition in view to demonstrate that such interpretation leads to serious inconsistencies.

Tenth Consideration

In the Ninth Consideration we considered the case of a wife who repented after she had committed adultery, and this, before her husband had the possibility to divorce her. In this present consideration we will assess the situation of a wife who has repented of her adultery, but this time, only after her husband had divorced her.

The question is the following: Will those who hold the “Sexual Immorality View” give her the right to remarry? If not, why not? She has now returned to a state of innocence and God doesn’t consider her an adulteress any longer. Or is there any Christian who would maintain she is still guilty, and still an adulteress?

In all logic, for those holding the ‘Sexual Immorality View’ she should have the right to remarry, for they have no scriptural basis to deny her that right. The only scriptural basis they could have is precisely the one they reject. This creates another dilemma for the adherents of the ‘Sexual Immorality View’, for as we have seen in Matthew 5:32, the wife who has always been faithful to her husband (whose husband divorced her) cannot remarry. According to Jesus if she would, she would commit adultery; the same is to be applied to the man who would marry her: “But I say to you that whoever divorces his wife for any reason except πορνεία causes her to commit adultery; and whoever marries a woman who is divorced commits adultery.”

This being the case, the faithful wife would be in disadvantage compared to the unfaithful wife who eventually received forgiveness from God, for here the faithfulness of the loyal wife would close the door for a lawful remarriage, and the unfaithfulness of the adulterous wife would open it, i.e., if she truly repents. Not very logical is it? In all sincerity I cannot accept such a conclusion as a viable option. But the moment we say πορνεία includes adultery in Matthew 5:32 and 19:9, this illogical conclusion is forced on us. To try to escape such conclusion several points of tension must be created, as well as discordances and incongruous statements. This is not a little issue, and it must be addressed with soundness and scriptural integrity.

Of course one could say the guilty party cannot remarry. But this would not answer the question because here the guilty party is no longer guilty. Actually my opponents believe the innocent party can remarry, therefore how can they permit one innocent party to remarry but not the other. Here lays the problem of my opponents.

Added to it, as we will see ahead, if my opponents would maintain the adulterous wife cannot remarry, they would be forced to conclude adultery doesn’t break the marriage bonds, which would cause their belief to self-destruct.

Section five

Considering Matthew 19:9

Eleventh Consideration

“And I say to you, whoever divorces his wife, except for sexual immorality, and marries another, commits adultery; and whoever marries her who is divorced commits adultery” (Matthew 19:9).

Let us approach this verse the same way we approached Matthew 5:32. For here also the verse is divided into two entities, namely, the generic rule and the exception to the rule. This engenders again two possible statements: the one according to the generic rule and the one according to the exception clause.

Again I have chosen a translation the adherents of the ‘Sexual Immorality View’ will endorse (a translation I obviously don’t agree with).

A—The statement according to the generic rule (Sexual Immorality View)

According to the Sexual Immorality View the generic rule could be stated as follows: “And I say to you, whoever divorces his wife for what has nothing to do with sexual immorality, and marries another, commits adultery; and whoever marries her who is so divorced commits adultery.”

B—The statement according to the exception clause (Sexual Immorality View)

Then we have the exception clause which can be stated as follow: “And I say to you whoever divorces his wife for sexual immorality, and marries another, does not commit adultery; and whoever marries her who is divorced on the basis of sexual immorality does/doesn’t commit adultery.”

Eleventh Consideration

Let us have a look to the first part of the B statement: “And I say to you whoever divorces his wife for sexual immorality, and marries another, does not commit adultery”. As we can see, this interpretation gives the right to the husband to remarry if his wife has committed adultery because he is innocent; at least this is what the adherents of the ‘Sexual Immorality View’ claim. But this creates an unjust situation in which some innocent parties can remarry and others cannot.

Following the Messianic teaching, as reported in Matthew 5:32, the faithful wife who has been possibly forsaken by an unjust, despotic, ruthless and selfish husband cannot remarry. But, according to the interpretation my opponents give to Matthew 19:9, the one who has been forsaken by an adulterous man can. Why this discrepancy? Where is the explanation? Where is divine justice in all this?

Twelveth Consideration

As we have read, the second part of the B statement can have two variations: “and whoever marries her who is divorced on the basis of sexual immorality does/doesn’t commit adultery.” Which one of the two does my opponents endorse?

Let us consider the first variation, which reads: “and whoever marries her who is divorced on the basis of sexual immorality does commit adultery.”

If this is the case, it entails there is something that can be adulterated. But what could this something be? The only logical answer is: the marriage between the adulterous wife and her first husband. But this could only happen if the marriage bond is still valid, i.e., not broken. Since the adherents of the ‘Sexual Immorality View’ maintain that adultery broke the marriage bond, how can someone adulterate a marriage that no longer exists? Consequently, according to the adherents of the ‘Sexual Immorality View’, the first variation must be ruled out. I am not saying they rule it out; I am only saying they should if they want to hold their view consistently. Reason and logic force it on them.

Let us look to the second variation, which is the only option the adherents of the ‘Sexual Immorality View’ have left: “… and whoever marries her who is divorced on the basis of sexual immorality does not commit adultery.” If this variation would be right then the guilty party would have the right to remarry, i.e., the remarriage would not entail adultery. After all, if the innocent party can remarry on the basis that he would not commit adultery if he does, then the same right must be given to the man who wants to marry the guilty party since he would not commit adultery either. But as we have already seen, this would lead to a nonsensical conclusion. It would mean the faithful wife of Matthew 5:32 & 19:9 would commit adultery if she would remarry, and the unfaithful wife of Matthew 5:32 & 19:9 would not. Surely God cannot be the supporter of such inconsistency.

As we can see, when we adhere to the ‘Sexual Immorality View’ we create another useless dilemma in which both variations becomes nonsensical, thus engendering scriptural discrepancies and logical tension.

Thirteenth Consideration

It seems quite obvious that πορνεία cannot mean sexual immorality in general, nor can it include such sins as adultery. For as we have seen, these interpretations create tension, inconsistencies, and discrepancies. But the moment we understand that πορνεία in Matthew 5:32 and 19:9 refers to fornication, all tension drops; no exclusions need to be applied to an all-inclusive word. Everything becomes harmonious, just, and plausible.

Fourteenth Consideration

At last I would like to underline the difficulty the adherents of the ‘Sexual Immorality View” face when counseling someone whose husband or wife has committed adultery. In all honesty I cannot conceive how they can say with full assurance of faith: “You are free to divorce him or her and get married again”. After all, there has been such controversy over the word πορνεία (porneia) that to adventure on that path seems little reasonable. The Bible teaches that what is not of faith is sin (Rom. 14:23). I don’t see how anyone can be fully convinced that πορνεία (porneia) includes adultery in Matthew 5:32 and 19:9. As a matter of fact, the evidences point to the opposite direction.

Section six

The context of Matthew 5:32

Fifteenth Consideration

When we are looking for the meaning of a word it is important to take into account the context in which it is found. This is the core of lexical semantic. To ignore this basic rule is to ignore logic. For instance, we read in Romans 8:8: “So then, those who are in the flesh cannot please God.” Then we read in 1 John 4:2 “Every spirit that confesses that Jesus Christ has come in the flesh is of God”. Obviously, the word “flesh” has different meaning in these two verses, and the meaning is understood by the context. The same is to be applied to πορνεία in Matthew 5:32.

One of the reasons leading me to believe πορνεία in Matthew 5:32 refers uniquely to a premarital sin is the flow of the context. Here logic becomes evidence. As we will see, each one of the six declarations creating the immediate context of Matthew 5:32 have two things in common: First they are all new; secondly each one passes from a known and common form of righteousness (the righteousness of the Law), to an unknown and astounding righteousness (the righteousness of Christ).

First declaration

In Matthew 5:21,22 Jesus passes from what was generally known, to an explosive and unprecedented declaration:

You have heard that it was said to those of old, ‘You shall not murder, and whoever murders will be in danger of the judgment.’ ²² But I say to you that whoever is angry with his brother without a cause shall be in danger of the judgment. And whoever says to his brother, ‘Raca!’ shall be in danger of the council. But whoever says, ‘You fool!’ shall be in danger of hell fire.” 

Here Jesus is passing from a righteousness well known to the Pharisees and Jews, to a new type of righteousness. What He declared was not only new, but also totally separated from the common way the religious people of His days were thinking. In other words, His declaration didn’t harmonized with the social context of His days.

Second declaration

Then comes Matthew 5:27–30

You have heard that it was said to those of old, ‘You shall not commit adultery.’ ²⁸ But I say to you that whoever looks at a woman to lust for her has already committed adultery with her in his heart. ²⁹ If your right eye causes you to sin, pluck it out and cast it from you; for it is more profitable for you that one of your members perish, than for your whole body to be cast into hell. ³⁰ And if your right hand causes you to sin, cut it off and cast it from you; for it is more profitable for you that one of your members perish, than for your whole body to be cast into hell.”

Here again the multitude is left breathless. This new moral standard had never been expressed throughout the annals of Israel. It transcended the social context and innovated a new era.

Third declaration

In the midst of this dumbfounded crowd Jesus continues His moral reform.

Furthermore it has been said, ‘Whoever divorces his wife, let him give her a certificate of divorce.’ ³² But I say to you that whoever divorces his wife for any reason except πορνεία causes her to commit adultery; and whoever marries a woman who is divorced commits adultery” (Matthew 5:31,32).

Unbelievable! Here again the social context is altogether substituted by a new standard. The multitude is full of consternation, awaiting the next blow.

Fourth declaration

“Again you have heard that it was said to those of old, ‘You shall not swear falsely, but shall perform your oaths to the Lord.’ ³⁴ But I say to you, do not swear at all: neither by heaven, for it is God’s throne; ³⁵ nor by the earth, for it is His footstool; nor by Jerusalem, for it is the city of the great King. ³⁶ Nor shall you swear by your head, because you cannot make one hair white or black. ³⁷ But let your ‘Yes’ be ‘Yes,’ and your ‘No,’ ‘No.’ For whatever is more than these is from the evil one” (Matthew 5:33–37).

Fifth declaration

“You have heard that it was said, ‘An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.’ ³⁹ But I tell you not to resist an evil person. But whoever slaps you on your right cheek, turn the other to him also. ⁴⁰ If anyone wants to sue you and take away your tunic, let him have your cloak also. ⁴¹ And whoever compels you to go one mile, go with him two. ⁴² Give to him who asks you, and from him who wants to borrow from you do not turn away” (Matthew 5:38–42).

The contrast between the righteousness the Pharisees followed—which was based on the Law—and the righteousness of Christ is simply mind-blowing.

Referring to his moral state before conversion Paul writes: “… concerning the righteousness which is in the law, blameless” (Philippians 3:6). But Jesus declared: “For I say to you, that unless your righteousness exceeds the righteousness of the scribes and Pharisees, you will by no means enter the kingdom of heaven” (Matthew 5:20). Notice that these words precede the six declarations I am here presenting. These statements, pronounced by Jesus Himself, are undeniably a passage from a righteousness known to the Pharisees to something unconventional in every respect. To say Jesus was simply reestablishing the righteousness of the Pharisees, as expressed by Shammai, is to miss the point.

Sixth declaration

“You have heard that it was said, ‘You shall love your neighbor and hate your enemy.’ ⁴⁴ But I say to you, love your enemies, bless those who curse you, do good to those who hate you, and pray for those who spitefully use you and persecute you” (Matthew 5:43,44).

The Golden thread

All these declarations are united by a common factor: They are all new. Each one of them presents a new standard of righteousness. What had been heard gives way to what had never been heard.

Now the verse under consideration, namely Matthew 5:32, is in the midst of these unprecedented affirmations. Why? Because it is also groundbreaking. It had never been taught in the rabbinical schools anywhere. Much had been said about divorce and remarriage, but what Jesus declared was totally different.

To pretend Jesus was merely repeating some Pharisaic doctrines would be to deny the contextual evidence of this verse. If all the other verses in Matthew 5:20–48 are universally accepted as being new, why should verse 32 be different?

If in Matthew 5:32 πορνεία would mean sexual immorality in general, then Jesus would have simply repeated what Shammai had taught for a few decades. For contrary to Hillel, his interpretation of Deuteronomy 24:1 led to the conclusion that the husband could not divorce his wife except for sexual immorality. As we have already seen, Jesus was not merely taking side with some Pharisaic doctrine, He was raising the moral standard to a level that had never been heard. No wonder the disciples were astounded:

If such is the case of the man with his wife, it is better not to marry” (Matthew 19:10).

Their reaction attests that what Jesus was presenting had never been heard in Israel.

I repeat: If πορνεία in Matthew 5:32 would mean sexual immorality in general, the disciples would have had heard it earlier, and the declaration of Jesus would not have amazed them at all. But they were unquestionably blown away.

The only divorce Jesus was permitting was the one between a man and his betrothed wife, and this, for reason of prenuptial sexual relation, i.e., fornication. As for those who were married, Jesus had put it clear enough: “Therefore what God has joined together, let not man separate” (Matthew 19:6).

Section seven

Two important observations

Sixteenth Consideration

First Observation

It is meaningful to notice how the issue of divorce began in Matthew 19.

The Pharisees also came to Him, testing Him, and saying to Him, “Is it lawful for a man to divorce his wife for just any reason?”

Most assuredly these Pharisees were followers of Shammai, the strictest of the two main authorities in Jewish legislation and vice-president (“ab bet din”) of the Sanhedrin. As such, Shammai believed Moses was permitting divorce solely for sexual immorality (see divorce in the Jewish Encyclopedia) as opposed to Hillel who maintained Moses was permitting it for any reason.

Being aware of the high moral standard Jesus held, these Pharisees were hoping to get Him on their side. But His answer left them aghast:

Have you not read that He who made them at the beginning ‘made them male and female,’ and said, ‘For this reason a man shall leave his father and mother and be joined to his wife, and the two shall become one flesh’?  So then, they are no longer two but one flesh. Therefore what God has joined together, let not man separate” (Matthew 19:4–6).

The response Jesus gave shattered their expectation to pieces. It became obvious to them that the Son of David was leaving no room for the divorce of married people. So they confronted Him with a question:

They said to Him, “Why then did Moses command to give a certificate of divorce, and to put her away?” (Matt. 19:7).

Their query confirms that Jesus had said something totally different from Moses, whether interpreted by Shammai or Hillel. This observation is particularly important. If anyone puts it in doubt, suffice it to consider that Jesus’ answer leaves little room for polemics:

He said to them, “Moses, because of the hardness of your hearts, permitted you to divorce your wives, but from the beginning it was not so” (Matthew 19:8).

Here we see Jesus insisting on the original divine standard, a standard He had already expressed from verse 4 through 6:

And He answered and said to them, “Have you not read that He who made them at the beginning ‘made them male and female,’ and said, ‘For this reason a man shall leave his father and mother and be joined to his wife, and the two shall become one flesh’? So then, they are no longer two but one flesh. Therefore what God has joined together, let not man separate.”

It is in this context that Matthew 19:9 must be understood: “And I say to you, whoever divorces his wife, except for πορνεία, and marries another, commits adultery; and whoever marries her who is divorced commits adultery.”

If in this verse πορνεία would mean “sexual immorality” in general, Jesus would have agreed with Moses as interpreted by Shammai. But the context shows clearly this was not the case. The reaction of the disciples is one of the evidences confirming Jesus’ disagreement with Shammai. After all, as most scholars believe, the Pharisees with whom Jesus was talking were most surely from the House of Shammai, i.e., they believed Moses was permitting divorce only in the case of sexual immorality. Consequently, by telling them: “Moses, because of the hardness of your hearts, permitted you to divorce your wives, but from the beginning it was not so” (Matthew 19:8), Jesus made clear He didn’t endorse the view of Moses as understood by Shammai or Hillel.

To maintain πορνεία in Matthew 19:9 means “sexual immorality” in general, one must endorse both the thesis and the antithesis simultaneously, i.e., he must affirm Jesus disagreed with Moses in verse eight, but agreed with him in verse nine. As we all understand, this is blatantly illogical.

To avoid this self-contradiction my opponents are left with two alternatives: they must maintain Jesus endorsed the view of Moses in verse eight (which is obviously not the case) or they must conclude πορνεία in Matt. 19:9 does not mean “sexual immorality” in general. In front of this choice my contenders have remained silent. Not a single answer has been given to this dilemma.

Second Observation

It is also meaningful that originally Jesus was not going to mention anything about the so-called “exception clause”. The answer He gave to these Pharisees was:

Have you not read that He who made them at the beginning ‘made them male and female,’ and said, ‘For this reason a man shall leave his father and mother and be joined to his wife, and the two shall become one flesh’? So then, they are no longer two but one flesh. Therefore what God has joined together, let not man separate” (Matthew 19:4–6)

As far as Jesus was concerned His answer was complete. It is precisely this completeness that prompted the Pharisees to confront Him with a question. The context shows clearly that if the Pharisees would have yield to Jesus’ answer everything would have ended there.

For my opponents this observation should appear bizarre, for they maintain everything about divorce can only be understood in the light of the exception clause, and in Matthew 19 Jesus was just about to leave it out. Happily—according to the view held by my opponents—the Pharisees rescued Jesus’ incomplete and misleading exposition, prompting Him to clarify the important doctrine.

This seems hardly a fair judgment, but the moment we say πορνεία means sexual immorality in general the exception clause becomes the cornerstone of the divorce and remarriage issue, and Jesus appears a novice in the art of clarifying such an important doctrine. In contrast, for those holding to the “Betrothal View”, Jesus appears complete, clear, and skilful.

Section eight

A few words from the Apostle Paul

Seventeenth Consideration

Romans 7: 1–4 “Or do you not know, brethren (for I speak to those who know the law), that the law has dominion over a man as long as he lives? ² For the woman who has a husband is bound by the law to her husband as long as he lives. But if the husband dies, she is released from the law of her husband. ³ So then if, while her husband lives, she marries another man, she will be called an adulteress; but if her husband dies, she is free from that law, so that she is no adulteress, though she has married another man. ⁴ Therefore, my brethren, you also have become dead to the law through the body of Christ, that you may be married to another—to Him who was raised from the dead, that we should bear fruit to God.” 

These words written by the Apostle Paul shed significant light on the subject. For here Paul is stating that the only way we can be set free from the law, and consequently from sin, is by the death of Christ. This exclusivity is the nucleus of Paul’s argument.

Wanting to make sure his readers will understand this absolute exclusivity, Paul set forth a powerful parallel:

For the woman who has a husband is bound by the law to her husband as long as he lives. But if the husband dies, she is released from the law of her husband. ³ So then if, while her husband lives, she marries another man, she will be called an adulteress; but if her husband dies, she is free from that law, so that she is no adulteress, though she has married another man.”

The reasoning of Paul goes as follows: As only the death of the husband can make the wife free to remarry, only the death of Christ can make us free from the law to remarry to Christ. Now to maintain something else than death can make a wife free from her husband amounts to say Paul used a relative example to illustrate an absolute principle. Surely Paul, with his experience as a teacher, could not have fallen in such incompetence. Obviously, he used this example because he believed only death has the power to break the marriage bound as he insists elsewhere. This is as indisputable as the following claim: Paul believed only the death of Christ can make us free from the law of sin.

Eighteenth Consideration

Questioning the so called “Pauline Privilege”

“But if the unbeliever departs, let him depart; a brother or a sister is not under bondage in such cases” (1 Corinthians 7:15).

This verse is part of some counsels Paul is giving to believers married with unbelievers. From the very outset he makes clear the Lord had not given these counsels: “But to the rest I, not the Lord, say …” (1 Corinthians 7:12).

Paul needed to address these matters because some brethren were confused about their marital situation. Some were wondering if their union was sanctified or defiled, and consequently, if they should remain with their unbelieving partners or depart from them. Others believed they were obliged to compel their unbelieving partner to remain with them against their will. This was causing contentions, which in turn gave rise to ugly situations. So Paul addressed these questions from verse 12 through 16, concluding that we are called to live peaceably.

It is important to notice that these questions were not covered by the Lord’s teaching, namely: 1) Is such a mixed union defiled? 2) Should the believer depart from the unbeliever? 3) Should the believer constrain the unbeliever to live under the same roof if contentions and debates ensue? Since the Lord had not addressed these issues, Paul could not possibly contradict Him.

However, another question arises: Could these forsaken Christians remarry while their respective husband or wife is still alive? Some Christians adventure to read between the lines and say yes. They draw their conclusion from verse 15, which says: “But if the unbeliever departs, let him depart; a brother or a sister is not under bondage in such cases. But God has called us to peace.”

What these Christians seem to forget is that this specific question had been clearly covered by the Lord’s teaching. We have it in Luke 16:18, Matthew 5:32 and 19:9. Let us have a brief look to Matthew 5:32 ““But I say to you that whoever divorces his wife for any reason except fornication causes her to commit adultery; and whoever marries a woman who is divorced commits adultery.” Here we see that the faithful woman who has been put away for a reason other than fornication cannot remarry, if she would, she would commit adultery as well as the man who would marry her.

This rule of conduct, published by the Lord Himself, is to be applied both to believers and unbelievers. Since this is the case, it applies to the three possible unions, viz. believers married with believers, unbelievers married with unbelievers, and believers married to unbelievers. There is no logical reason why the third group should be exempt from complying with the Lord’s command.

To say that Paul had the right to answer questions uncovered by the Lord is one thing I agree with, but to attribute to Paul the authority to abolish a part of the Messianic teaching about remarriage is inadmissible.

According to the Messiah, a person is free to remarry only and exclusively if the wife is guilty of πορνεία. This is explicit in the Lord’s teaching expressed in Matthew 5:32 and 19:9. It is clear, categorical, logical, and undeniable. Consequently, to claim that there is another reason established by the Apostle Paul is contrary to logic. When Paul says: “But to the rest I, not the Lord, say …” he obviously refers to something the Lord had not covered in His teaching, but remarriage had undeniably been covered by the Lord, and covered authoritatively.

Added to it, to make sure he was understood, Paul closes the chapter with these solemn words: “A wife is bound by law as long as her husband lives; but if her husband dies, she is at liberty to be married to whom she wishes, only in the Lord” (1 Corinthians 7:39). As we can observe, this conclusion follows the counsels given to those unmarried and widows. So surely it was not written for them. So for whom was it written? It was written for all the cases of married people he had referred to in the chapter, which includes believers married to unbelievers. This is confirmed by Romans 7:2 & 3.

A revealing scenario

According to those who believe in what has been called the “Pauline privilege”, i.e., believers can remarry when the unbeliever abandons them, the following scenario is acceptable: A man forsakes his faithful wife because she burns the food too often. The poor woman is left alone and, according to Jesus, cannot remarry (see Matthew 5:32). Meanwhile her non-Christian neighbor forsakes his wife because she is a stupid Christian who burns the food too often. Now, according to those who believe in the “Pauline privilege” there is a huge difference between the two women, the first one cannot remarry but the second can. Such a conclusion seems hardly logical and surely unfair. It seems to me this conclusion is incoherent with who God is. Such a conclusion doesn’t only lack logic, but it also lacks scriptural harmony.

For those who hold the ‘Betrothal View’ this problem doesn’t exist because both women are forbidden to remarry until their respective husband dies. Here we have justice and equity. One could try to get around the problem by saying both women can remarry. But to do this they will have to trample Matthew 5:32 under foot, which would be unacceptable.

Section nine

Considering Jeremiah 3:8 & Ezra 10

Nineteenth Consideration

“And I saw, when for all the causes whereby backsliding Israel committed adultery I had put her away, and given her a bill of divorce; yet her treacherous sister Judah feared not, but went and played the harlot also” (Jer. 3:8).

Some people have used this verse in the attempt to demonstrate that God cannot be absolutely against divorce since He is here divorcing Israel. Such a conclusion reveals a fallacious exegesis. Here God is simply making use of a metaphor to make sure Israel and Judah will understand His feelings. This doesn’t mean He endorses divorce. It only means God took an example they all understood to convey a message they might not have understood as clearly without the metaphor.

That the reference about divorce in Jeremiah 3:8 is used solely as a figure of speech is made clear by the context. In verse 14 we read: “Return, O backsliding children,” says the Lord; “for I am married to you…” If someone would use this verse to maintain God cannot be absolutely against incest today since He has married His children would be to misread the meaning of this specific metaphor. The same is true about God referring to Israel and Judah as two sisters He has taken for wife—Jer. 3:6­–10 (see also Ezekiel 23:1–4). Imagine someone would use this metaphor to insinuate God cannot be totally against polygamy today since He has married two sisters in Jer. 3:6­–10 (see Lev. 18:18 as well). What would you tell him? You would certainly tell him this is a fallacious conclusion. The same is true about divorce. One thing is certain: a difference must be made between figures of speech and reality otherwise moral chaos will ensue.

Twentieth Consideration

Ezra chapter ten has also been used to demonstrate that God cannot be totally against divorce since He blessed the Israelites when they put away their pagan wives (Ezra 10:1–3, 11, 19, 44). But here we are not dealing with divorce but with repentance. In Malachi 2:16 God says that He hates divorce. The word used for divorce is שָׁלַח (shâlach), but in Ezra the word used for putting away is יָצָא (yâtsâ). It is so because we are not dealing with the same thing.

A marriage is made when God joins husband and wife together: “What therefore God hath joined together, let not man put asunder” (Mark 10:9). But in Ezra chapter ten God had not joined them together. It could be compared to a “marriage” between two people of the same sex. If one repents and leaves his partner we would not call it a divorce because God has never joined them together. For instance, in Matthew 5:32 we read: “… and whoever marries a woman who is divorced commits adultery”. Here we have a “marriage” but God is not involved in it. He doesn’t join them together. This is why such a “marriage” leads to adultery. If the man would repent and put away the divorced woman we would not call it a “divorce”, but rather the fruit of repentance.

Conclusion

At the light of what has been said it would seem a pastor could hardly counsel a divorcee to remarry, for how could he reach a place of absolute certainty when the evidences point to the opposite direction.